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RECENT CASE NOTES
BANKRUPTCY-SECURED DEBTS-JURISDICTION OF STATE CouRTs-C was
adjudged bankrupt in the District of Texas. Her estate included land
in Arkansas. Isaacs was elected trustee. Thereafter plaintiff, the holder
of a note secured by a mortgage on the land, brought foreclosure proceed-
ings in the state court of Arkansas, making C and Isaacs defendants and
reciting that plaintiff had not filed its secured note as a claim in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. The question certified to the Supreme Court by the
Circuit Court of Appeals was: After the bankruptcy court has acquired
jurisdiction of the bankrupts estate and the referee has ordered sale, by
the trustee, of all the bankrupt's property but before the trustee has taken
any steps to sell land, part of such estate, entirely located in another judi-
cial district, can a suit to foreclose a valid mortgage thereon be commenced
and an order of sale thereunder be made over the objection of the trustee,
by the court of the latter district? Held, the Supreme Court answered in
the negative on the ground that the bankruptcy court had exclusive juris-
diction to deal with the property of the bankrupt estate.1 This conclusion
was based on the following propositions: 1. Upon adjudication, title to the
bankrupt's property vests in the trustee with actual or constructive pos-
session, and is placed in the custody of the bankruptcy court. 2. The title
and right to possession of all property owned and possessed by the bank-
rupt rests in the trustee as of the date of filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy.2
The bankrupt's adjudication by operation of law vest title in the
•trustee.S The words of the act are, "The trustee * * * upon his
appointment and qualification shall * * * be vested by operation of
law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged a
bankrupt."4 It is quite clear that until there is a trustee there can be no
vesting of title in a trustee.5 The act states that the trustee shall be vested
upon his appointment and qualification. The title vests in him in point
of time at that moment but it vests as of the date of the adjudication. In
other words, as Remington points out, "Title vests in the trustee for
creditors, upon his appointment and qualification, but then relates back to
the date of the bankrupt's adjudication."6
There is nothing in the act to warrant the proposition that the trustee's
title relates back to the date of the filing of the petition. Before title passes
to the trustee, as of the date of adjudication, it remains in the bankrupt,
though of course there are restrictions on his right to dispose of the
1 Isaao v. Hobb Tie & Lumber Co., 51 Sup. Ct. 270 (1931).
'For this latter proposition the court cites Robertaon v. Howard, 229 U. S. 254,
259, 260, 33 S. Ct. 859, 67 L. Ed. 1174; Wells & Co. v. Sharp (C. C. A.), 208 F. 393;
Galbraith-Hilliard Grooery Co. (C. C. A.), 216 Fed. 842.
3H(8cock v. Varech Bank of New York, 206 U. S. 28, 51 L. Ed. 946, 27 S. Ct.
681, 18 A. B. R. 9.
' Sec. 700.
5 See Rand v. Iowa C. Ry. Co., 186 N. Y. 168, 78 N. E. 574, 16 A. B. R. 697.
64 Remington, Bankruptcy (3 ed.) 6.
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property. The bankrupt may, in some instances make a valid transfer
of title at some time between the filing of the petition and the adjudication.7
Although the title vests in the trustee as of the date of adjudication,
the "property which vests in the trustee is that which the bankrupt owned
at the time of the filing of the petition."s Property acquired by the bank-
rupt after the filing of the petition is not, to- use the language of the Act,
property which "prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means
have transferred." There is a distinction between the time of vesting of
title in the trustee and what property vests at that time which seemingly
was overlooked in the principal case.
S. K.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-ESTOPPEL - An
incorporated town purchased fire equipment from X company. This was
unquestionably within its powers.' As payment for said apparatus, four
promissory notes bearing interest at the rate of six per cent per annum
were given by the town to X company. Said notes were transferred to
the appellant in due course, for a valuable consideration, and before
maturity. The appellant later sought to enforce collection of two of said
notes alleged to be due and unpaid.
The appellee town demurred to the complaint on the ground that it did
not appear therein that the state board of tax commissioners had approved
the issuance and execution by the appellee of the notes sued upon. Appellee
relied upon a statute providing among other things that: "All bonds or
other evidences of indebtedness hereafter issued or sold by any municipal
corporation of this state may bear interest not to exceed six per cent
per annum provided that the state board of tax commissioners shall approve
all such issues where rate of interest is in excess of five per cent."2 The
demurrer was sustained by the trial court and judgment was rendered
for appellee thereon when appellant elected to stand upon its complaint.
Held, judgment affirmed. Failure to obtain such approval renders the
notes void.3
The case exhibits with exacting clarity the burdens upon one who
accepts such evidence of indebtedness of a municipal corporation. The
instrument shows on its face that it has been issued by a municipality.
This alone charges the holder thereof with notice of statutory requirements
that are prerequisite to a valid issue of the obligation.4 To make his
position secure, he must convince himself prior to accepting the instrument
that all such requirements for a valid issuing thereof have been satisfied.
It obviously follows in view of these facts that if action is brought on
the note or bond, the complaint must allege that the instrument was issued
in the manner prescribed by law, or said complaint is subject to demurrer.
TIn re Perpall, 271 F. 466, 46 A. B. 1. 302; Johnson v. Collier, 222 U. S. 538,
56 L. Ed. 306, 32 Sup. CL 104, 27 A. B. R. 454; Matter of Mertens, 142 Fed. 445,
73 C. C. A. 561; In re J. VI. Lavery & Son, 235 Fed. 910, 37 A. B. R. 606; Gordon v.
Mech. d Grodus Ins. Co., 45 So. 384. 22 A. B. R. 649.
8 Everett v. Hudson, 228 U. S. 474, 57 L. Ed. 927.
' Burns' Ann. St. 1926, see. 11277, subdlv. 3.
S Burns' Ann. St. 1926, sec. 14240, par. 2.
'Citizens' Bank of Anderson v. Town of Burnettsville, 179 N. E. 724, Appellate
Court of Indiana, Feb. 13, 1932.
' Oppenheimer v. Greencastle School Twp. (1905), 164 Ind. 99, 72 N. E. 1100.
